Computer modelling reveals the optimal development for the organisational structure of business clusters by Al-kfairy, M. et al.
Computer Modelling Reveals the Optimal Development for 
the Organisational Structure of Business Clusters   
M. Al-kfairy, S. Khaddaj and R. B. Mellor. 1 
Computing and Maths, Kingston University, London, UK.   
1 = corresponding author at r.mellor@kingston.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: 
Science and Technology Parks (STPs) foster innovation 
between firms inhabiting the cluster. Networking 
channels are considered as integral parts of the 
knowledge exchange process, and therefore the 
innovation process. We simulated three organizational 
topologies for STPs; firstly, in the star model all are 
connected to the cluster initiative (CI), secondly the 
strongly connected model, when all are connected to 
each other, and finally the randomly connected model, 
where the network follows no centralised topology. 
Analyses used adjacency matrixes and Monte-Carlo 
simulation, trading transaction (networking) costs 
against knowledge benefit. Results show that star 
topology is the most efficient form from the cost 
perspective, and this is especially the case for start-up 
STPs. Later, when the cost of knowledge transformation 
is lowered, then the strongly connected model becomes 
the most efficient topology, but this transition to high 
transaction costs is very risky if direct ties do not quickly 
result in tangible benefits. 
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Science and Technology Parks (STPs) are defined as a cluster of 
interconnected firms often working in the same or similar industries 
and connected to a nearby institute of higher education (Porter, 
2000). In technology entrepreneurship (Mellor, 2019) they have 
many designations, including: Technopolis, catapult, silicone-
something-or-other, research/science/technology/park, STP, business 
cluster, tech-hub, etc (all with or without incubators). They are 
environments designed to support the creation of high technology 
economic development. Firms and the individuals inhabiting STPs 
acquire different benefits through enhancing knowledge spill-over, 
providing a pool of knowledgeable labour and they furthermore 
encourage innovation activities through networking and the sharing 
of ideas (Cojocaru and Ionescu, 2016). They are used as tools in 
initiatives involving regional development. Indeed, examples like 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Saxenian, 1994) have prompted 
national and local governments to build imitations, often consciously 
applying the ‘triple helix principle’ of connecting venture capital, 
educational institutions and public resources (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000). This popularity amongst regional planners has 
led to a proliferation of STPs and the international association of 
science parks and areas of innovation (IASP) has reported a 
doubling in the numbers of its constituent members between 2007 
and 2016 (IASP, 2016). Furthermore, Rowe (2014) reported that 
there are more than 365 STPs in Europe, employing around 750,000 
people and with total investment of €12 billion.  
 Unfortunately, there is a high failure rate for STPs (Wadhwa, 
2013). The World Bank (Kelly and Firestone, 2016), report success 
rates of around 20% and a rate of abject failure of around 20%, both 
figures globally, while in Wales 6 out of 10 failed recently (Pugh et 
al. 2018). A recent report by Ernst and Young (2017) states that for 
the £2.2bn UK Catapult programme, "... it is unlikely that the impact 
of the network overall has been significant ..." 
 STP conglomerations exhibit a range of developmental 
profiles, perhaps starting as an “adhocracy” or similar and 
subsequently enter an often-opportunistic scramble for development. 
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz (see e.g. Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, and 
more recently Will et al., 2019) have shown that ambidextrous 
organizational structure determines organizational performance. 
Aiming to increase STP performance we pose the research question: 
What is the optimal organisational structure of a new STP and how 
does that change as the STP develops and matures?  
Case-based approaches clearly only investigate survivors, but we 
adopt an innovative econometric approach to answer this question 
because a modelling approach has the advantage of being completely 
case-independent.  
Researchers have studied STPs from different dimensions; for 
example, Menzel and Fornahl (2009) and Sonderegger and Täube 
(2010) studied STP life cycle and tried to compare it to the product 
lifecycle. They proposed a methodology using data from on-cluster and 
off-cluster firms, alongside other parameters including the number of 
firms, to strive to identify the current developmental stage of any STP. 
Cojocaru and Ionescu (2016) identified the advantages and 
disadvantages of STPs, while other authors e.g. (Klofsten et al., 2015) 
studied the success of Cluster Initiatives (CIs) from the management 
perspective and identified five main factors; a well-defined idea, well 
networked and motivated management teams, well-organized 
networking activities, 'critical mass' of active firms as members of the 
cluster, and finally the degree of organization of the CI. Finally, 
Sternberg (2014) found little evidence for any impact arising from 
direct government support on the success of individual start-ups, 
especially spin-offs from universities, implying that they may be better 
helped in a nurturing STP-type environment instead. 
High levels of innovation have been identified as one of the main 
success factors for business clusters in general and it is cited as one of 
the main reasons for creating STPs, which in turn has provoked 
different metrics and measures to evaluate innovation at STP level. 
These include methods based on R&D investments using quantile 
regression analysis e.g. (García-Manjón and Romero-Merino, 2012) 
and R&D volatility e.g. Mudambi and Swift, (2011). However, 
investigating R&D investments suffers the disadvantage that the 
effects of R&D investment occur in the longer term and over a longer 
period. The number of patents is a further metric that has been used 
(Delgado et al., 2014), but again cheap measures like trade secrets, or 
even applications for ‘blocking patents’ to thwart competitors, all tend 
to make results using this metric unclear. Nevertheless, innovation at 
STP level is believed to be enhanced by knowledge spill-over through 
firms networking and various studies such as Al-kfairy et al.,(2017); 
Al-kfairy et al., 2018; Bell, (2005); Squicciarini,( 2008); and Dettwiler 
et al., (2006) all show that  networking within STPs (‘on-cluster’ 
firms)  is a significant factor in stimulating innovation in STPs to a 
level above that found in isolated firms (‘off-cluster’ firms) . For 
example, the formal and informal links that form the STP cluster 
network construct different topologies (structures) in STPs (Markusen, 
1996), which in turn bring in different benefits and have various costs 
attached.  
Two approaches typify building STPs: First, a ‘top-down’ 
approach, when STPs are established as a vision of regional or public 
authorities to further enhance regional innovation and financial 
development, and this has recently become the favoured approach 
world-wide (Skokan et al., 2012), mostly in form of science and 
technology parks e.g. Mjärdevi science park - MSP - in Sweden. 
Conversely, is the ‘bottom-up’ approach, where an STP is recognized 
as a ‘critical mass’ of similar and related industries in a specific area, 
which then comes to the notice of Multi-National Corporations 
(MNC), start-ups, and governments, who in turn try to develop it 
further (Skokan et al., 2012). A typical example of the bottom-up 
approach is Silicon Valley where MNCs had to open offices in order to 
not be left behind by new innovations.  
In this paper, we use computer simulation techniques to evaluate 
the efficiency of innovation network forms by using the knowledge 
transformation costs and benefits occurring between firms in an STP. 
We aim to elucidate; which topology benefits a developing STP most, 
and how can this best change with age and development?  
In order to build a comprehensive overview of the optimal 
topology, the next section (section 2) examines earlier and related 
work. Section 3 details the model design; section 4 shows the results 
while section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of the 
results in the light of current debates. 
 
2 Previous work 
 
2.1 Porter and the knowledge-based view 
Networking and partnerships were identified as major determinants 
benefitting corporate innovation through knowledge sharing and 
transformation (Morosini, 2004; Pitelis, 2012; Mellor, 2014a, Mellor 
2014b, Mellor, 2015). For example, empirical studies of STP success 
factors through the cluster life cycle have identified networking and 
trust as recurring success factors, which are very important in all stages 
of cluster evolution (Tavassoli and Tsagdis, 2014). Moreover, Ting 
Helena Chiu (2008) contributes towards understanding that the more 
central a firm is in the network, the more innovative it is. While, 
Saxenian (1994) argued that positive rivalry sprit was one success 
indicator, where competitors have no problem in contacting each other, 
using the power of informal networking to solve regular issues and 
exchange new ideas, seek finance and solve day-to-day issues. Indeed, 
Mellor (2015) showed that such ‘just-in-time’ knowledge is nearly as 
powerful as original homegrown innovations. 
The ‘Porters diamond’ allows researchers to distinguish between 
e.g. firms and their suppliers, firms and customers, firms and higher 
education institute(s) and within firms themselves (Porter, 1998). 
Although Porters’ diamond contributes to our understanding of how 
each component adds into the overall knowledge (knowledge stock) of 
a cluster, it does not distinguish between the different topologies in 
STPs and how that fits into different methods of establishing them 
(top-down or bottom-up). Moreover, Iammarino and McCann (2006) 
compared transaction costs and innovation within STPs exhibiting 
three different topologies. Their findings included: 
 Personal relationship and social network: transaction costs 
are minimized by ‘trust’ between organizations, although 
building a trust relationship requires a long-term 
relationship.  
 Complementarities effect: the relationship between 
firms and their suppliers, and other forms of 
partnership. 
 Industrial topology of input-output:  a long-term investment 
distinguished as having expensive ‘entry and exit costs’. 
Networking involves knowledge and innovation sharing through 
formal and informal channels. At the firm level, a 3D model was 
proposed to connect innovation with organizational performance to 
understand the effect of departmentalization on firms’ performance 
(Mellor, 2011; Mellor, 2014a; Mellor, 2018). Between firms, formal 
channels include inter-firm relationships as well as informal channels 
like personal relationships. Moreover, Bell (2005) investigated the 
outcome of social and formal networking in a Canadian mutual fund 
cluster and argued that the more informal and socially networked the 
managerial team is, the more positive impact they had on firms’ 
innovation albeit that the information source may limit the information 
they provide. However, that - in turn - did not have a large impact on 
the overall innovation output. On the other hand, it is also clear that 
large amounts of networking resources do not automatically imply 
good innovation (Guan and Chen, 2010), and networks with little and 
no learning capabilities can be quite ineffective (Gilbert et al., 2007). 
Bathelt et al. (2004) distinguished between knowledge acquired 
by freely available knowledge inside a community ‘local buzz’ 
exhibiting close proximity, and investments named ‘pipelines’, which 
normally occur with the outside world (i.e. external to the cluster). 
Pipelines transfer codified knowledge, while local buzz is more tacit. 
However, these authors do not consider the acquisition of new 
knowledge or how this can benefit the cluster. Tacit knowledge 
sharing is one of the main factors that sustain business clusters 
(Bathelt et al., 2004; Breschi and Malerba, 2001; Maskell and 
Lorenzen, 2004). Informal and formal channel of networking enhance 
trust, which in turn decreases friction in the knowledge transfer 
process between firms, provided it is up to date and that firms can 
avoid any lock-in effects (Breschi and Malerba, 2001; Tallman et al., 
2004). However, building trust requires time and investment 
especially through the informal channels (Iammarino and McCann, 
2006). Some knowledge is proprietary i.e. private within the firm and 
is prevented from leaking. While ‘architectural knowledge’ can be 
shared, which addresses how firms organize, share, and adapt any 
knowledge obtained, and that is rarely immediately applicable and 
acquires further costs due to the need to be adapted to the new 
situation (Maskell, 2001). Moreover, there is evidence implying a 
relationship between explicit knowledge and process innovation, 
while tacit knowledge was found to be more related to product 
innovation (Casanueva et al., 2013). 
 Eisingerich et al. (2010) emphasized the role of social networks 
on sustaining the cluster performance. They defined ‘network 
strength’ and ‘network openness’. Network strength is the regularity 
and depth of the interaction, trust, and ‘stability of the connections’, 
while network openness is measured by the ease of acceptance of new 
members into the network, links to the outside world, and the 
‘diversity’ of the members. There are two obvious proviso here, firstly 
in a freshly-founded cluster ‘network strength/openness’ cannot exist, 
and secondly in times of industry uncertainty, strong networks 
decrease the performance of a cluster. Network openness had a 
positive impact on cluster performance (Eisingerich et al., 2010). 
Similarly, a ‘small world’ network structure between cluster 
organisations was discussed by (Kajikawa et al., 2010), where path 
length between organisations and a clustering coefficient were used to 
distinguish it from random-walk network structure. Shortest paths 
between firms can identify the small world network, and the 
availability of network shortcuts reduces path length. Overall, the 
findings from eight Japanese clusters suggested that network impact is 
positively related to the network size combined with ‘small world’ 
formation, meaning that the larger the network, the more benefits are 
expected to be gained by participating firms (Kajikawa et al., 2010). 
He and Fallah (2009) confirmed that networking has a positive 
relationship regarding innovation and cluster development in a mixed 
topology structure, where the degree of connectivity may be an 
indicator of cluster development stage. Breschi et al. (2001) added 
that the lack of university – industry network caused clusters to 
decline or fail. This again underlines the importance of continuous 
innovation, disseminated by an innovation network, in building a 
sustainable STP cluster.   
2.2 Markusian business clusters 
Knowledge transformation through networking links would 
normally shape the networking structure within the STP and indeed 
(Markusen, 1996) distinguished between four different types of 
general business clusters: First, the ‘Marshallian industrial districts’ 
when firms’ connections are built around suppliers that are off-cluster, 
plus small on-cluster firms and customers relations (off-cluster firms). 
In this case, the on-cluster firms shape a randomly connected network 
with a very high flexibility regarding labour movement within the 
constituent cluster firms. Because of the tendency towards 
specialization in the same industry sector, there is a parallel tendency 
to improve the knowledge stock inside the cluster as tacit knowledge 
is transferred through employees’ movements between firms, while 
codified knowledge moves through formal channels e.g. suppliers’ 
pipelines. 
Second is the ‘hub-and-spoke’ district, where the cluster/STP is 
built around one or more dominant large firms in similar industries. 
This type occurs when there are one or few central organizations and 
all other firms are connected to the centre through ties that can consist 
of e.g. spin-offs or informal social connections. It implies a strong 
connection between on-cluster and off-cluster firms, but with less 
cooperation with competitors. In this form of cluster/STP, knowledge 
transfer is achieved through the ‘hub’ or central organisation, which is 
considered to be the main source of coordination.  
The third type is ‘satellite industrial district’; which is a critical 
mass but can be quite difficult to consider as a cluster, because it does 
not conform well to most definitions of clusters. It consists of a critical 
mass of organisations in non-related industries where the business 
cluster is built around small organizations or branches of larger 
organizations, which are relatively isolated from each other and only 
connected to their headquarters or off-cluster customers. In this case, 
the main knowledge spill-over occurs vertically between branches of a 
firm and its headquarters, with less cooperation between co-located 
firms.  
Finally, the ‘state-centred’ industrial districts, when STPs are built 
around one or more government-controlled research institutions or 
state-supported cluster-coordinating organizations that provide 
infrastructure, i.e. a more traditional science park type structure, where 
the central organisation (the cluster initiative or CI) is established. This 
may typically govern an incubator programme, and within time the 
incubated firms start to graduate and cluster around this central 
organisation as described in the ‘triple helix’ model connecting public, 
venture capitals (VCs), and higher education institutions (HEI) see e.g. 
(Klofsten et al., 1999; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Kim et al., 
2014). The proviso is; that the networking structure within STPs may 
change over time as the STP matures and the overall organizational 
topology evolves (Menzel and Fornahl, 2009).  
As to topology, ‘Marshallian industrial districts’ would be 
expected to be an adhocracy, which moves to a more centralist aspect 
in the ‘hub-and-spoke’ district model. A ‘satellite industrial district’ 
would be expected to exhibit aspects of a non-controlled multi-level 
model, while ‘state-centred’ would (at least initially) conform to a star 
topology. Clearly, what is needed in all cases is a net increase in 
innovation capabilities that is large enough to produce more benefits 
than the investments spent to build and stimulate this network.  
2.3 The transaction cost approach 
Thus, the costs of networking can be considered to be a form of 
transaction cost, but all previous studies have neglected to consider the 
cost of obtaining knowledge in STPs, assuming it is close to zero. In 
this study, we argue that any transacted knowledge will not be 
available for free because it requires communication time, which has a 
cost attached to it. Moreover, the knowledge obtained will most often 
require adaptation and must be correctly interpreted by the receiving 
firm, thus incurring more costs. Previous work (Mellor, 2011; Mellor, 
2014a) shows that the linkages represent potential benefit and while 
there is no guarantee that any specific link will have a quantifiable 
benefit, the number of links does represent a theoretical maximum 
gross benefit. The gross benefit, minus costs, result in net benefit, 
which in turn is assumed to be positive. 
We have chosen to build directly on Markusen’s (1996) work to 
measure the networking cost in three different network topologies: 
These are described in the next section.  
   
 
3 Design Modelling and Simulation 
In this study, we modelled three different scenarios of tech-hub 
network topology, which are: 
 
A. Star model, where all enterprises are connected to one 
central organization, the Cluster Initiative (CI). The CI is 
defined as a central intermediary organization, which is 
trying to help STP members to grow (see Klofsten et al., 
2015), by e.g. connecting firms inhabiting the STP with 
Venture Capital (VC) and public bodies. In this model, each 
constituent organization has exactly one tie connected to the 
central organisation, and all clusters’ firms are connected 
through that organisation. In this case, CI represents the 
cluster ‘hub’, and all firms are connected to it, a topology 
sometimes also referred to as ‘state centred cluster’. 
Typically, this is the case for the development of science 
parks like Mjärdevi Science Park in Sweden (Hommen et 
al., 2006; Mjardevi Science Park, 2016). Moreover, it is a 
crucial part of the triple helix phenomena (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000). Figure 1 illustrates this model (all 




Figure 1. Illustrating the Star Mode, where CI=Cluster Initiative, VCs 
=Venture Capital and Gov =Government and HEI=Higher Education 
Institution 
 
B. Strongly connected model. This model represents the case 
when all companies are centric and connected to each other. 
For example, if we have (N) companies, then each company 
is connected to (N-1) companies. In this case, all firms are 
centric to the network, and knowledge sharing takes place 
between all firms simultaneously. This represents a strong 
‘spoke-and-hub’ topology (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustrating the Strongly Connected Model, where 
Gov=Government, VCs =Venture Capital and HEI=Higher Education 
Institution. 
 
C. Tree model (Multi-Level) of randomly connected firms. 
This represents randomly connected firms within the cluster; 
when firms are connected to a subset of firms in first level 
direct connection (L1), another subset of level two (L2), level 
three (L3) and some firms are still isolated. Where L1, L2, L3 
and LD represent number of firms connected in level one, two, 
three and 1,2,3 and D represent the distance between the 
firms. This cluster topology represents different structures 
(mainly Marshallian districts), where there are multiple 




Figure 3. Illustrating the Multi-Level Model 
 
In all three models, each connection is apportioned a networking 
cost that is attached to communication between information gatekeepers, 
as well as within the firm. This cost is a net sum of time spent building 
trust, adaptation, re-design or discussion time.  This represents the cost 
(C) drawn randomly from a normal distribution with a random mean (µ, 
selected to be 0 ≤ µ≤100 from normal distribution) where the cost was 
included for cases when the costs for communication tend to zero e.g. 
lunch time meetings or personal friendship events, and here σ2 is equated 
to 1. In this scenario, each company will gain some benefits (B) from the 
knowledge obtained. Assuming that the value of the knowledge gained 
will always be positive, then the benefits were randomly obtained with 
(1≤ µ ≤100) and σ2 will be unity (1).   
Because the International Association of Science Parks and Areas 
of Innovation (IASP) reported that the current STPs (Science and 
Technology Parks) contain between less than 50 firms and somewhat 
over 1000 firms, and where most STPs host between 100 and 400 firms, 
we initiated a computer model where the average number of firms was 
randomly obtained between 6 and 500 firms, i.e. well within the outliers. 
Then the firms were put into a topological shortest path (NxN) matrix, 
generated from an adjacency matrix. Three symmetric (NxN) matrices 
were generated:  
i. Networking Cost Matrix (C), which includes the costs of random 
ties between firms, because the connection is assumed to be bi-
directional, meaning that we count only one symmetrical 
connection between two firms.  
ii. Networking Benefit Matrix (B), this includes random ties gains 
(assuming that each networking tie will have financial gains, we 
call this networking gross benefits) and the same C and B were 
used for all three topologies examined to ensure case-by-case 
consistency. 
iii. Distance Matrix (D), refers to the third topology and consists of 
the assumed distance between randomly connected firms.  
 
Next, Monte Carlo simulations were performed with 1000 
iterations, but with different numbers of firms, average costs and 
firms’ matrices, according to the topology selected. The results were 
initially stored in Microsoft Excel files, and subsequently injected 




4.1 Star topology 
In the star model as presented in figure 1, each firm (Ni) is connected to 
a central node, called the CI (cluster initiative). The CI is responsible 
for co-ordination with one information gatekeeper per firm, who in turn 
shares and spreads the knowledge obtained openly within their firm. Eq 
1 calculates the total benefits gained by networking, using the gross 
benefit minus the costs of each connection with the CI. If the CI is 
represented by firm at index (1), then the net benefit of networking for 
firm j, will be B1,j – C1,j, where j ≠ 1. Put simply, we just go through the 









   Eq. 1 
From the adjacency matrix, a distance matrix was generated 
(table 1), where the distance between each firm and the central 
organization (CI) is 1, and between each firm and each other firm is 
exactly 2. Communication is always happening through the central 
organization, which obviates the need to incur the costs of walking the 
whole path between two different firms. Therefore, distance factor for 
this organisation structure is neglected because multiplying the D=1 
with the cost C, will always result in C. 
 
Table 1. Illustrating the adjacency matrix (Star Model) 
Firms A B C D 
A 0 1 1 1 
B 1 0 2 2 
C 1 2 0 2 
D 1 2 2 0 
 
 
Using the aforesaid configuration, Figure 4 shows that in the 
extreme worst case the total net benefit can be up to -31677. 
Conversely, the extreme best case would be +40668 with a mean of -
390. The Pearson correlation between average networking (gross) 
benefits, average networking costs, and the average number of firms 
with net benefit show that the average number of firms has no effect on 
the total gross gain (R2 = -0.063 and p-value = 0.045), while the 
average cost is the main determinant of benefit (R2 = -0.613 and p-
value less than 0.001), with less effect from average gain (R2= 0.599 
and p-value less than 0.001) albeit that the absolute difference between 
the gain and cost effect is not very large.  These results imply that, even 
though this topology can minimize damage, it does not maximize 
benefit.  In other words, this topology is beneficial under those 
conditions where the investment involved in networking is high, 
regardless of the cluster size. 
 
 
Figure 4. The mean number of firms VS net benefit (Star Model) 
 
4.2 Strongly connected topology 
 
In this model, all firms in the business cluster are in a centric 
position and cross-linked. The transaction costs incurred between 
firms are obtained from the matrix C, where each index represent the 
connection between firm (i) and firm (j), then the matrix entry Ci,j  
and equivalent are the benefits from the connection Bi,j. However, 
the connection is bi-directional meaning it counts for (i) and (j) 
connection as well as j and i. Therefore, the connection i,j is only 
counted and the connection j, and i neglected,  so that we go through 
half of each matrix (C, and B) instead of the whole matrix. This is 
also true for the third topology (randomly connected). Similar to star 
topology, the distance factor for this topology was ignored. To sum, 
the total net benefit can be obtained by applying eq. 2 (connection 




i j i ji j
B C
 
  , where i ≠ j, Eq. 2 
 
 
Table 2. Adjacency matrix (strongly connected model) 
Firms A B C D 
A 0 1 1 1 
B 1 0 1 1 
C 1 1 0 1 
D 1 1 1 0 
 
Figure 5 and 6 presents two scatter plots regarding number of 
firms (N), net benefit (π) as well as mean cost, respectively. A sample 
of the simulation output is shown in table 3 and a larger sample is 
available in the appendix. Descriptive statistics regarding minimum, 
maximum, and average net benefit are shown in table 4.  The analysis 
of the data shows that the strongly connected topology can be much 
more beneficial for the STP and the client firms involved, than the star 
topology is; however, in the worst case it can also be very harmful, for 
example in the case where only low benefits accrue accompanied by 
near-exponentially expanding co-operation costs, so if direct ties do not 
result in tangible benefits, then this scenario would be very expensive.  
. 
 
Table 3. A sample table (Strongly Connected Model) 






Strongly connected (Net 
Benefit) 
17 33.9 26.3 1,014.37 
34 76.96 2.91 41,501.31 
225 23.74 3.72 504,552.00 
283 7.03 3.34 146,831.40 
306 13.24 2.84 485,089.50 
339 6.55 45.05 -2,205,142.00 
389 12.69 26.48 -1,041,321.00 
409 12.79 57.54 -3,734,216.00 
431 12.57 0.64 1,076,628.00 
471 34.77 3.26 3,487,064.00 
493 6.72 15.74 -1,093,278.00 
 
The mean number of firms was denoted at random to from table 10 and 
are presented, re-ordered, to illustrate that cluster size does not impact the 
final benefit. 
 













-7,611,257.90 9,976,724.80 -86,316.50 1,620,837.90 
This table shows that the strongly-connected model can be very beneficial, 











Figure 6 Strongly Connected Net benefit VS Mean Cost 
 
Correlation analysis shows that cluster size (as number of firms) 
has no impact on the net benefit, which is the same conclusion as found 
for the star topology, meaning that it is not possible to predict the 
optimal number of firms in an STP using networking structure only, 
because both mean cost and mean gross benefit has almost-equivalent 
impact (one positive for mean benefit, and one negative for mean cost) 
with (R2= 0.504 and -0.520, with p-value of less than 0.001 for both of 
them), or that in larger STPs networking costs increase but benefits also 
increase proportionally. One observation is that the impact of cost for 
strongly connected, is less than the star topology, while the impact of 
mean benefit is similar.  
 
4.3 Multi-level (Tree) topology 
 
In reality, clusters will not follow a specific networking topology 
especially when the agglomeration will tend to follow demand rather 
than a stricter state vision. Thus, firms will eventually become 
connected to firms that interest them in a mixed topology. For example, 
firm (X) could establish a partnership agreement with another firm (Y), 
a supplier for example, who would establish another partnership with 
another supplier (Z), this would create the pairs (X, Y) and (Y, Z) which 
indicates that firm (X) is connected to firm (Z) through firm (Y), and 
indeed this chain can be much longer, but for simplicity in this model 
we assume that it is maximum four levels. In this case, there will be 
firms which are more centric than other firms, and some firms which 
are more isolated and therefore need to build connection networks. 
Consequently, a distance factor must be added to the total cost. For 
simplicity, we assume that the distance will be multiplied by the cost, 
so if the distance becomes two, then the cost will be doubled, given that 
the first order distance is always one. Table 5 illustrates a sample 
distance matrix (D), in a symmetric matrix, where the same distance is 
assumed between firm (i) and ( j) as well as between ( j) and (i). 
Similarly, to the strongly connected model, the connection cost and 
benefit were only counted once (half of the matrix). 
 
Table 5. An adjacency Matrix for the Multi-Level Mode 
Firms A B C D 
A 0 2 1 2 
B 2 0 1 2 
C 1 1 0 1 
D 2 2 3 0 
 
 
, , ,1, 1
N
i j i j i ji j
B C D
 
   , where i ≠ j Eq. 3 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 show mean cost and mean gross benefit plotted 
against net benefit and the analysis indicates that there no correlation 
between net benefit and distance, with correlation coefficient -0.02, p-
value = 0.534 implying that distance does not significantly affect final 
benefit. On the other hand, and in contrast to previous topologies, the 
number of firms exhibited a moderate impact on net benefit of -0.432 
with p-value less than 0.001. Moreover, the mean gross benefit had a 
low impact on the final net benefit, while mean cost has higher impact 
in this case than in the cases of the strongly connected and star models 
(-0.618 and p-value less than 0.001). This confirms that this topology 
can be helpful under conditions of low communication costs and high 
knowledge benefits e.g. in smaller highly-specialized STPs.  
 











-19,323,860.80 9,692,557.80 -1,662,454.30 
 
This table illustrates that multi-level model can be less efficient when costs 
are high, and benefits are low, and vice versa (compare table 4) 
 
The picture overall (table 6) shows that, in the best-case, tree 
topology is beneficial for the cluster (maximum obtained net benefit), 
except where the knowledge obtained is expensive, or if it is not 
particularly beneficial. Under these conditions then it is better to avoid 
this type of structure (minimum net benefit). 
 
 





Figure 8 Mean Cost VS Net Benefit (Multi-Level Model) 
 
 
4.4 Comparing topological structures 
 
The previous sections presented the results obtained from simulating three 
different cluster topologies without a priori knowledge of which structure 
is better for an STP or why. In order to understand the effect of each 
structure on the development STPs, dummy variables were created, which 
are the size representing the STP size expressed as the number of firms 
and divide the STP into five groups (1 – 5), each group consist of 100 
firms. Then divide the cost into four groups (1 - 4), resulting in 20 
different categories, where the impact of the three different structures can 
be determined.  
Tables 7 - 9 present the mean values of three different topologies 
with different sizes and cost categories. These tables confirm the 
findings presented in earlier sections that the main factor influencing 
the cluster net benefit from knowledge is the mean cost. These results, 
which focus on the mean values only (please note that other descriptive 
statistics are available in the appendix, see tables 11– table 15), show 
that the mean net gain upon implementing a strongly connected 
network structure (or even the randomly connected multi-level one) is 
better than the star model under conditions where the knowledge 
sharing cost is small, regardless of the cluster size. However, the star 
model becomes a better solution when the costs become more 
expensive.  
We assume that during the early stages of an STP or when 
ideas/products are still young, the cost of sharing will be higher, 
especially if the firms network is not well-established. Moreover, in 
case of state-centred STPs, most firms will be start-ups, SMEs etc and 
that inter-personal connections will hardly be matured, which in turn 
implies a costly development and knowledge sharing, which indicates 
that when STPs  are still new, a star topology is the most efficient 
cluster topology.  
However, when knowledge sharing costs are low, then as shown 
in tables 11 -15 in the appendix, the strongly connected model will 
perform better. This means that as knowledge becomes more accessible 
and widespread (i.e. to be found in many firms) and the STP matures, 
then the cost of knowledge sharing, and implementation will decrease, 
and as consequence the star model will not be as helpful as other 
models. Because the strongly connected model is the best performing 
model among all the three investigated, this implies that – at the firms’ 
level – the more centric the firm is in the network, the more it will 
benefit from knowledge sharing.  
The randomly (multi-level) topology is about as valuable as the 
strongly connected model, albeit that these benefits diminish as the 
cluster grows. Overall, the randomly connected topology is as efficient 
as the strongly connected topology under circumstances where the cost 
of knowledge sharing and application is low, i.e. the STP is still small 
and the knowledge is mature. The drawback is that it is harder to 
transform this topology into a strongly connected topology if it 
becomes needed, and this may become a major hurdle in future of that 
STPs development. 
In conclusion, simulation results show that the star topology is the 
best, when the networking costs are high, which in turn is associated 
with the earlier stages of cluster development. On the other hand, later 
in STP development, when connection costs are low, a trust network is 
established and knowledge benefits are high, then the strongly 
connected topology is most efficient. However, under these 
circumstances, the randomly connected model can also be as efficient 
as the strongly connected topology, albeit that this is affected by the 
STP size. In particular, tables 7, 8, and 9 shows that in multi-level only, 
when costs are smaller than benefits, does increased size tend to 
decrease the profit (net benefit). However, this is not the case for star 
and strongly connected models. 
 
Table 7. Star Topology Net Benefits (Mean) 









(Firms) Mean Cost 
0– 10 1,319.15 3,759.62 3,669.34 6,143.43 9,644.34 
11 – 25 607.54 565.56 2,038.85 1,151.28 1,211.52 
26 – 50 -662.81 -1,644.55 -4,014.13 -1,792.38 -4,730.21 
51 – 100 -1,792.16 -6,062.40 -8,817.38 -15,780.70 -17,935.70 
 
 
Table 8. Strongly Connected Topology Net Benefits (Mean) 









(Firms) Mean Cost 
0 – 10 44,725.65 285,229.80 463,710.90 1,086,392.00 2,162,513.00 
11 – 25 21,533.38 40,932.74 256,963.20 186,220.40 241,816.80 
26 – 50 -22,742.90 -129,100.00 -505,972.00 -308,025.00 -1,084,207.00 






Table 9. Multi-Level Topology Net Benefits (Mean) 









(Firms) Mean Cost 
0 – 10 35,019.43 207,093.10 262,121.60 690,955.90 1,490,524.59 
11 – 25 -27,268.70 -253,275.00 -525,406.00 -1,413,441.00 -2,351,561.54 
26 – 50 -117,532.00 -813,158.00 -2,283,365.00 -3,711,968.00 -6,583,097.32 
51 –100 -255,283.00 -1,562,314.00 -3,839,448.00 -8,891,550.00 -12,936,421.06 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Regardless of STP size, the main factor affecting the net benefit of 
knowledge sharing is the cost of knowledge acquisition. In this respect, 
the star model is the most efficient topology when the cost of obtaining 
and adapting knowledge (i.e. transforming knowledge into innovation) 
is high. The strongly connected model will perform better later on in 
STP development when costs are low, and the multi-level topology 
performs relatively poorly under all the conditions tested.   
These findings support earlier work by (Lee et al., 2010) who 
recommended starting with a central organization, which helps start-ups 
to innovate more and maintain a good networking structure with other 
firms in the industry and indeed the (Lee et al., 2010) model is similar 
to the star model introduced in this study where the central organization 
can be a CI or it can be e.g. a tech-incubator. Here, the CI represents the 
state anchored model as presented by Markusen, (1996), while tech 
incubators can be simulated using the DI (diversity innovation) number 
attached to transaction costs, a concept introduced by Mellor, (2014 
and Mellor, 2015).  
The strongly connected model simulated the case when all 
companies are in centric positions (similar to the hub-and-spoke model, 
when all firms are dominant) which Chiu (2008) reported to be the best 
position for firms in innovation networks, and indeed the simulations 
reported here confirm the efficiency of this topology, but also show that 
it is only the most suitable when costs are low. Indeed, if firms want to 
innovate more, they must incur some costs in order to be more centric. 
This topology may be attractive for mature firms, which have either 
started to generate money or have attracted investors. 
While the multi-level connection may be the one most often used 
by a firm, it is clearly advantageous to avoid this topology under 
conditions where knowledge sharing is expensive.  
Clearly factors other than those discussed here may contribute to 
the capacity of a tech hub/cluster, for example the space available, 
availability of venture capitalists (VCs) and proximity of related 
industries. Moreover, as the regression analyses in previous sections 
indicate, it is not possible to predict the optimal STP size using only the 
firms networking structure, which in turn is influenced by many factors. 
However, marginal effects like marginal gains and marginal costs could 
be added to future models to see if there is such a concept of an optimal 
size for an STP. 
Generally, the findings in this paper have both research and 
policy implications. First, they suggest that policy makers at regional 
level should start by implementing a central organisation (CI), if they 
are following the ‘top-down’ approach to STPs. Then, once the STP is 
well-established, they can let it move freely, possibly tending towards a 
strongly connected solution, however, a randomly connected model will 
be as beneficial as the strongly connected model, when the ‘trust’ 
network is well-built and has a cost close to zero. If this is not the case, 
then the model shows clearly that a CI “star” topology must remain in 
place to avoid excessive transaction costs without concomitant benefits, 
which is clearly a risky strategy.  
Concepts such ambidexterity (Benner and Tushman, 2015) may 
also be relevant, where a STP, surrounded by innovations and 
innovative firms wanting entry, has to decide on which innovations to 
implement. This is essential because not inviting new talent means that 
incumbents may proceed along a developmental path where on-cluster 
firms slowly enter a technology lock-in stage featuring few innovations, 
thus even in “non-star” structures, some form of CI is needed to steer 
the cluster in fruitful directions. Presumably if this is successful, then 
eventually large firms and MNCs will arrive, “fishing” for new talent 
and new innovations.  
The results presented here are based on a theoretical framework 
from which we have built a conceptual model for optimizing innovation 
networks, including that the development of an STP is not analogous to 
a product life cycle or a Y-shaped path starting with an adhocracy then 
choosing either star or hub-and-spoke, but indeed is more nuanced and 
may include devolving from star topology to other forms as the costs 
(to use the terminology of Mellor 2011, and Mellor 2014a, “per unit 
length of knowledge trails”) decrease. Indeed, historically one case 
study (MSP) began as a state-sponsored centre initiative with 6 
companies in a star configuration (topology). Then, it moved into a 
hybrid (Klofsten et al., 1999; Mjardevi Science Park, 2016; Tavassoli 
and Tsagdis, 2014), and today it is so large that it is uncertain what 
topology it has now, except for that it is no longer ‘star’. Supporting 
evidence for this can be obtained by looking at other STPs including 
Umeå with ~100 micro-firms (named Uminnova), and Gothia Science 
Park with ~80 micro-firms and 2 large firms, one can also observe that 
they have both started in star topology (Gothia Science Park, 2013), and 
it will be interesting to see at what developmental stage the star 
topology starts to be superseded.  
One other limitation of this work is its conceptual nature, as it is 
based around topology only and needs to add other factors that 
influence the development of the inhabitants of STPs e.g. financial 
factors, social factors, and size factors at firm level. To address this and 
to build a more comprehensive view of what the best method for 
building and enhancing the development of STPs is, we report in a 
companion paper (Al-kfairy et al., 2019) on differences between on-
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409 12.79 57.54 1 -18,236.40 -3,734,216.00 -10,964,839.08 5 4 
431 12.57 0.64 1 4,978.09 1,076,628.00 943,873.22 5 1 
471 34.77 3.26 3 14,855.99 3,487,064.00 2,945,730.49 5 1 
306 13.24 2.84 3 3,174.66 485,089.50 284,332.71 4 1 
17 33.90 26.30 1 116.16 1,014.37 -4,540.68 1 3 
389 12.69 26.48 2 -5,381.14 -1,041,321.00 -4,035,799.94 4 3 
225 23.74 3.72 3 4,452.20 504,552.00 363,053.43 3 1 
283 7.03 3.34 1 1,007.11 146,831.40 -53,557.30 3 1 
493 6.72 15.74 4 -4,423.73 -1,093,278.00 -3,956,443.24 5 2 
339 6.55 45.05 4 -13,017.90 -2,205,142.00 -6,068,879.07 4 3 
34 76.96 2.91 1 2,445.85 41,501.31 39,052.00 1 1 
273 7.04 9.08 3 -568.68 -75,670.80 -585,151.10 3 1 
259 8.07 14.24 2 -1,648.99 -206,499.00 -923,976.14 3 2 
149 40.12 22.64 2 2,559.09 192,675.60 -181,203.31 2 2 
273 1.16 0.86 2 37.42 8,061.28 -51,337.52 3 1 
120 25.80 5.62 3 2,421.89 144,243.00 84,591.58 2 1 
134 47.08 4.33 3 5,676.96 380,985.00 323,257.27 2 1 
399 4.57 35.36 4 -12,220.40 -2,444,164.00 -6,661,941.46 4 3 
73 2.53 17.49 2 -1,066.06 -39,310.60 -106,349.44 1 2 
458 31.21 21.54 1 4,407.19 1,012,410.00 -2,360,653.71 5 2 
426 8.57 25.34 3 -7,157.46 -1,517,924.00 -4,956,021.36 5 3 
202 5.79 15.46 2 -1,963.32 -196,250.00 -665,034.17 3 2 
7 16.92 2.01 1 93.89 323.05 267.78 1 1 
58 33.28 14.77 3 1,040.19 30,552.65 -6,579.61 1 2 
348 19.86 7.48 2 4,258.73 747,884.80 69,899.20 4 1 
500 2.79 38.25 1 -17,718.60 -4,422,938.00 -11,594,714.26 5 3 
239 2.81 0.19 3 495.57 56,714.25 22,195.64 3 1 
143 2.81 31.48 2 -4,061.87 -291,081.00 -761,705.20 2 3 
70 48.82 65.89 1 -1,183.96 -41,220.60 -279,208.82 1 4 
197 13.62 31.29 3 -3,444.22 -341,174.00 -1,244,819.82 2 3 
394 53.37 3.52 2 19,630.91 3,860,316.00 3,453,029.15 4 1 
460 6.55 7.51 2 -470.81 -101,367.00 -1,289,905.10 5 1 
131 8.54 40.91 2 -4,203.97 -275,660.00 -804,557.09 2 3 
469 43.90 17.09 2 12,574.30 2,941,891.00 134,540.75 5 2 
188 53.48 30.59 2 4,302.19 402,176.20 -402,785.13 2 3 
94 16.15 1.42 4 1,374.51 64,115.28 54,304.72 1 1 
139 4.71 8.90 4 -557.12 -39,823.10 -168,456.90 2 1 
50 60.61 22.58 3 1,865.10 46,572.72 4,327.78 1 2 
161 19.16 30.09 3 -1,717.60 -140,516.00 -722,522.12 2 3 
26 1.40 0.30 2 26.50 225.45 -190.60 1 1 
400 0.92 48.79 4 -19,042.60 -3,805,003.00 -9,651,955.33 4 3 
340 43.34 33.97 4 3,144.83 539,912.40 -2,376,120.99 4 3 
475 4.35 15.11 3 -5,074.38 -1,211,140.00 -3,757,372.03 5 2 
474 1.35 21.99 2 -9,721.28 -2,302,977.00 -5,994,976.94 5 2 
32 57.18 35.33 1 663.75 10,840.58 -15,983.63 1 3 
202 20.50 2.73 4 3,575.80 360,730.30 276,858.95 3 1 
495 12.58 38.63 1 -12,832.60 -3,184,718.00 -10,299,365.56 5 3 
283 17.19 11.67 4 1,536.12 220,433.90 -479,693.69 3 2 
448 13.29 59.66 3 -20,725.50 -4,642,146.00 -13,581,172.08 5 4 
77 87.75 11.42 2 5,835.25 223,335.20 173,412.40 1 2 
494 52.48 41.18 2 5,597.10 1,375,503.00 -6,140,758.21 5 3 
474 1.46 7.75 3 -2,945.90 -697,112.00 -2,001,978.05 5 1 
63 35.69 12.12 4 1,482.92 45,933.49 10,507.98 1 2 
400 8.28 18.88 1 -4,224.33 -845,446.00 -3,107,428.90 4 2 
286 24.96 4.32 4 5,926.48 841,619.80 578,059.41 3 1 
136 61.51 0.87 2 8,182.11 554,741.40 539,773.47 2 1 
150 42.89 0.00 1 6,263.26 470,354.30 456,882.80 2 1 
202 4.68 19.96 3 -3,083.27 -310,158.00 -919,787.25 3 2 
300 51.77 35.07 1 5,007.25 749,086.70 -1,588,587.90 3 3 
158 21.54 24.32 4 -399.03 -34,422.50 -484,086.80 2 2 
85 23.25 0.02 1 1,883.98 80,097.93 75,701.47 1 1 
454 7.65 11.38 3 -1,698.48 -382,630.00 -2,130,817.73 5 2 
298 35.65 32.18 3 1,035.13 153,505.90 -1,973,650.54 3 3 
281 42.79 20.76 1 6,147.57 866,189.10 -361,375.04 3 2 
412 15.85 4.64 1 4,636.13 948,905.50 359,059.02 5 1 
438 2.33 0.62 4 564.29 132,957.70 -3,219.56 5 1 
65 37.27 38.60 3 -87.77 -2,672.87 -124,007.29 1 3 
213 60.98 19.71 4 8,713.07 931,650.90 269,082.74 3 2 
450 26.93 15.17 2 5,256.73 1,187,883.00 -1,116,911.33 5 2 
148 17.72 6.13 3 1,708.16 126,335.10 27,522.50 2 1 
465 61.92 8.69 1 24,678.35 5,743,020.00 4,338,101.61 5 1 
124 0.38 12.58 4 -1,417.94 -89,234.80 -231,429.23 2 2 
414 92.45 72.61 2 8,208.83 1,696,320.00 -7,613,359.62 5 4 
451 10.69 22.57 3 -5,318.99 -1,204,493.00 -4,643,838.83 5 2 
295 3.68 63.52 2 -17,551.40 -2,594,670.00 -6,720,320.02 3 4 
431 56.84 49.39 4 3,169.65 689,517.10 -6,169,115.24 5 3 
267 37.00 4.45 2 8,659.38 1,156,074.00 919,413.70 3 1 
68 27.57 31.47 4 -272.78 -8,880.92 -114,656.12 1 3 
281 0.13 5.76 2 -1,377.87 -194,922.00 -537,829.64 3 1 
330 29.20 24.60 3 1,527.42 249,720.30 -1,745,932.71 4 2 
480 5.76 1.23 2 2,076.20 508,322.10 278,750.45 5 1 
248 4.32 2.16 3 561.31 65,519.53 -34,951.57 3 1 
150 24.89 8.04 3 2,499.64 187,994.20 52,149.64 2 1 
497 4.11 4.90 2 -417.42 -97,032.70 -1,004,269.21 5 1 
378 1.05 72.05 4 -26,706.70 -5,047,679.00 -12,733,685.01 4 4 
48 9.31 23.56 3 -672.07 -16,087.30 -57,516.04 1 2 
314 9.26 43.23 1 -10,640.90 -1,669,270.00 -4,858,838.42 4 3 
296 59.32 15.02 1 13,087.03 1,934,058.00 952,418.03 3 2 
306 33.53 1.18 4 9,874.15 1,504,250.00 1,413,174.97 4 1 
433 1.45 4.94 2 -1,434.22 -320,213.00 -1,013,324.14 5 1 
190 25.37 15.22 2 1,943.09 182,013.40 -229,813.22 2 2 
215 25.66 8.48 1 3,642.44 395,414.50 103,101.83 3 1 
239 71.45 10.68 4 14,429.48 1,728,022.00 1,274,417.40 3 2 
312 9.59 17.37 2 -2,424.46 -377,680.00 -1,643,570.22 4 2 
81 5.40 0.25 2 364.89 14,746.76 10,540.91 1 1 
249 43.86 9.00 2 8,627.68 1,076,347.00 657,773.01 3 1 
115 42.70 65.32 3 -2,559.61 -148,390.00 -789,172.04 2 4 
457 8.62 26.01 2 -7,996.92 -1,812,938.00 -5,881,137.64 5 3 
414 35.16 0.22 2 14,191.48 2,935,975.00 2,831,120.23 5 1 
125 71.48 7.54 4 7,941.64 495,409.60 407,718.55 2 1 
447 51.91 8.01 1 19,553.95 4,376,637.00 3,181,236.12 5 1 
82 1.53 14.60 2 -1,065.04 -43,321.70 -116,604.65 1 2 
495 82.14 35.83 2 22,931.34 5,662,481.00 -901,993.70 5 3 
420 13.60 30.38 2 -7,029.05 -1,476,909.00 -5,492,150.58 5 3 
407 14.54 2.79 2 4,731.68 970,749.50 625,006.79 5 1 
88 30.89 18.82 3 1,038.38 46,234.73 -60,911.36 1 2 
361 37.18 29.40 3 2,803.20 505,207.70 -2,355,703.95 4 3 
183 59.16 18.64 3 7,369.70 674,285.60 203,363.68 2 2 
491 84.51 1.52 4 40,668.54 9,976,725.00 9,692,557.76 5 1 
185 24.11 8.70 1 2,825.50 262,313.70 37,582.57 2 1 
396 4.79 61.11 4 -22,261.80 -4,404,324.00 -11,590,320.93 4 4 
338 49.15 48.35 4 234.54 45,535.16 -4,068,776.26 4 3 
206 14.85 88.44 1 -15,083.80 -1,553,880.00 -4,379,644.36 3 4 
226 8.44 15.41 3 -1,549.51 -177,481.00 -765,246.31 3 2 
370 0.90 46.57 2 -16,787.80 -3,103,937.00 -7,871,833.30 4 3 
368 28.80 39.03 4 -3,712.31 -691,149.00 -4,637,446.81 4 3 
150 2.90 17.52 4 -2,205.74 -163,123.00 -459,587.89 2 2 
138 7.05 47.79 2 -5,575.97 -385,425.00 -1,068,673.65 2 3 
234 2.19 1.21 2 195.77 24,165.06 -30,130.19 3 1 
10 53.07 23.23 1 276.66 1,359.67 -522.84 1 2 
476 39.22 21.13 3 8,577.42 2,045,120.00 -1,542,190.65 5 2 
89 8.24 21.95 2 -1,182.43 -53,755.40 -184,426.01 1 2 
165 27.82 70.50 1 -6,981.40 -577,226.00 -2,015,115.14 2 4 
294 14.89 3.74 4 3,294.10 480,160.20 239,717.67 3 1 
471 14.85 7.17 1 3,577.53 849,697.40 -338,613.96 5 1 
75 60.61 13.46 2 3,514.30 130,842.20 75,675.78 1 2 
468 25.74 21.69 4 1,921.58 442,042.20 -3,115,442.26 5 2 
60 5.02 23.86 1 -1,108.33 -33,348.80 -97,088.41 1 2 
197 3.19 3.49 3 -47.27 -6,092.86 -108,558.16 2 1 
70 22.19 3.83 4 1,280.93 44,340.76 30,685.38 1 1 
422 19.45 6.55 3 5,472.37 1,144,911.00 271,127.47 5 1 
488 35.07 17.36 3 8,636.90 2,104,099.00 -982,992.76 5 2 
491 12.56 57.80 2 -22,138.40 -5,442,354.00 -15,864,502.31 5 4 
83 11.32 12.70 1 -125.83 -4,577.10 -70,027.46 1 2 
472 5.02 18.37 2 -6,277.44 -1,484,163.00 -4,556,106.61 5 2 
20 15.36 54.96 2 -752.91 -7,539.20 -21,918.53 1 4 
286 8.31 38.29 2 -8,477.80 -1,221,744.00 -3,559,313.40 3 3 
199 5.97 9.67 2 -759.35 -73,080.20 -360,072.16 2 1 
454 59.08 0.00 3 26,442.53 5,993,656.00 5,870,265.46 5 1 
241 40.54 51.33 1 -2,619.45 -312,293.00 -2,533,623.37 3 4 
99 6.67 20.19 3 -1,317.77 -65,613.10 -212,186.81 1 2 
305 52.75 4.31 2 14,711.16 2,246,161.00 1,947,305.15 4 1 
444 9.90 41.67 1 -14,087.00 -3,124,154.00 -9,253,851.48 5 3 
409 32.09 8.84 1 9,495.49 1,940,595.00 837,226.41 5 1 
312 23.83 32.71 2 -2,747.40 -430,565.00 -2,821,790.07 4 3 
480 0.70 40.50 4 -18,897.00 -4,541,922.00 -11,522,365.71 5 3 
50 80.93 3.05 2 3,805.95 95,397.06 89,721.47 1 1 
85 34.31 40.82 1 -527.28 -23,329.60 -238,461.58 1 3 
226 2.95 2.61 2 82.43 8,547.71 -91,484.20 3 1 
246 48.09 19.42 2 7,029.81 863,589.90 -13,635.01 3 2 
44 19.04 70.44 4 -2,209.09 -48,656.60 -146,654.50 1 4 
395 8.28 12.00 4 -1,460.30 -290,107.00 -1,693,302.68 4 2 
382 8.77 24.38 4 -5,924.47 -1,135,381.00 -3,797,141.24 4 2 
91 0.92 23.14 3 -1,993.79 -90,292.30 -232,282.54 1 2 
192 51.89 29.34 4 4,349.51 413,225.30 -395,803.39 2 3 
219 13.94 0.20 4 2,858.35 313,715.60 284,463.89 3 1 
342 4.09 2.50 3 549.20 92,786.55 -127,119.20 4 1 
453 10.71 26.15 3 -6,983.19 -1,580,683.00 -5,592,467.91 5 3 
101 5.23 5.89 4 -66.55 -3,422.73 -48,675.21 2 1 
252 6.00 22.43 4 -4,131.99 -519,538.00 -1,575,012.19 3 2 
145 15.38 14.63 1 98.75 7,625.02 -224,370.23 2 2 
382 72.85 28.97 2 16,740.34 3,192,557.00 27,928.61 4 3 
253 0.18 19.68 4 -4,765.51 -601,573.00 -1,539,572.67 3 2 
250 24.48 13.14 4 2,806.67 353,028.90 -265,401.88 3 2 
80 20.81 58.43 4 -2,961.54 -118,981.00 -394,988.90 1 4 
248 2.16 73.39 1 -17,628.10 -2,181,310.00 -5,528,599.94 3 4 
357 2.87 40.48 3 -13,363.80 -2,389,696.00 -6,256,398.40 4 3 
335 3.67 22.04 4 -6,127.62 -1,028,155.00 -2,877,921.57 4 2 
27 31.55 1.25 4 778.53 10,566.35 9,882.71 1 1 
472 16.34 4.07 1 5,787.21 1,363,008.00 685,123.31 5 1 
89 52.38 4.69 3 4,202.68 186,707.40 159,055.26 1 1 
227 2.75 42.68 3 -9,060.73 -1,024,397.00 -2,675,289.41 3 3 
263 40.61 20.86 2 5,181.85 680,579.00 -406,752.20 3 2 
10 2.21 8.59 3 -55.68 -281.94 -861.13 1 1 
449 2.62 50.82 1 -21,614.50 -4,847,107.00 -12,487,637.83 5 4 
21 29.51 70.47 4 -814.11 -8,633.02 -30,211.88 1 4 
290 2.17 14.56 2 -3,596.38 -518,533.00 -1,441,588.48 3 2 
495 7.64 4.51 4 1,537.88 383,809.10 -442,873.15 5 1 
154 49.84 33.18 4 2,550.08 196,221.00 -397,335.28 2 3 
275 3.47 15.93 1 -3,436.96 -469,471.00 -1,362,884.47 3 2 
412 39.03 0.68 2 15,641.03 3,222,033.00 3,098,169.07 5 1 
82 14.49 5.45 2 719.20 30,037.95 2,363.10 1 1 
127 20.78 70.22 1 -6,228.36 -395,373.00 -1,223,627.04 2 4 
454 43.89 9.91 2 15,390.00 3,494,411.00 1,966,146.43 5 1 
427 5.93 6.46 3 -239.91 -49,381.50 -934,108.15 5 1 
229 1.97 31.88 4 -6,845.80 -780,353.00 -2,029,129.09 3 3 
86 19.95 35.43 3 -1,305.40 -56,813.60 -253,337.98 1 3 
486 9.28 16.30 4 -3,395.18 -827,555.00 -3,708,181.72 5 2 
456 11.49 10.23 1 569.08 130,969.90 -1,465,260.68 5 2 
466 9.26 16.89 4 -3,596.90 -827,102.00 -3,569,607.96 5 2 
223 10.21 43.70 2 -7,456.22 -828,842.00 -2,460,356.82 3 3 
450 34.44 7.30 3 12,220.47 2,742,799.00 1,637,972.71 5 1 
453 44.47 39.40 4 2,298.32 519,123.00 -5,544,693.69 5 3 
368 2.49 40.29 3 -13,880.50 -2,552,171.00 -6,626,697.27 4 3 
372 3.36 6.22 3 -1,031.09 -197,275.00 -838,796.06 4 1 
105 13.57 19.64 3 -646.80 -33,123.60 -195,677.21 2 2 
488 9.10 10.64 1 -716.93 -183,419.00 -2,070,773.93 5 2 
44 9.45 15.87 4 -279.11 -6,070.39 -29,598.91 1 2 
























Mean 2.51 1,319.15 44,725.65 35,019.43 
Median 3.00 703.22 14,124.11 10,078.32 
STD 1.06 1,640.24 69,799.81 66,016.85 
Max 4.00 6,821.34 334,663.20 304,809.60 



















Mean 2.72 3,759.62 285,229.80 207,093.10 
Median 3.00 2,499.64 183,646.20 117,001.10 
STD 1.10 3,836.75 327,638.30 336,393.60 
Max 4.00 14,220.06 1,400,465.00 1,276,355.00 




























Mean 2.69 3,669.34 463,710.90 262,121.60 
Median 3.00 2,387.16 308,558.60 154,509.40 
STD 1.06 4,631.38 602,630.50 628,960.40 
Max 4.00 22,856.17 3,069,430.00 2,667,548.00 




















Mean 2.46 6,143.43 1,086,392.00 690,955.90 
Median 3.00 4,258.73 733,939.40 466,942.60 
STD 0.92 6,450.86 1,172,756.00 1,204,708.00 
Max 4.00 27,679.30 5,042,497.00 4,847,798.00 




















Mean 2.22 9,644.34 2,162,513.00 1,490,525.00 
Median 2.00 7,737.05 1,628,261.00 943,873.20 
STD 1.01 9,572.77 2,213,581.00 2,290,458.00 
Max 4.00 40,668.54 9,976,725.00 9,692,558.00 
Min 1.00 -2,945.90 -697,112.00 -2,001,978.00 
 
 
